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Owens review 
 
Owens concentrates on promising and forgiving as ways of changing the 
normative landscape. These are highly explicit and transparent ways of taking on ǡǯǤ 
 
But various things that we may do short of promising can commit. Brewer gives 
an example in which someone, within a collective debate about which joint 
decision to make, indicates that they favour taking a certain line: this person 
commits themselves to a certain kind of active support of the decision if it is 
adopted (unless she makes an explicit and public renunciation Ȃ in which case 
she has a duty to make such a renunciation, and a responsibility to explain her 
reasons for doing so). So such a person takes on commitments, but it may not be 
entirely clear to her Ȃ or she may not be entirely explicit about it Ȃwhich 
commitments she is taking on.  
 
There is a view on which the binding nature of promising is more fundamental 
than the binding nature of these other commitments. But promising cannot bind 
in a vacuum. It only makes sense to think of promising as being binding in the 
case that other things hold Ȃ one of which is that there is some grounds to be ǯǡimportance of honesty, 
non-deception, integrity, being truthful, being honourable and decent, etc. If we ǯǡ
promise could make any normative change. So promises only bind in a context in 
which other moral features are taken to hold.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Promises and the basic position of the book 
Bare wronging: one can wrong a person by breaking a promise when no interest ǯby keeping the promise. 
 
Can that be explained? One view takes it that it is only our interest in being able ǯ
promising. That would explain why the practice makes sense Ȃ why it arises. It 
gives a functional explanation of the practice. But a further question is, why ǯǤ 
 
Functionalism about Obligation 
Contrast a) it is good for people to act as though they have an obligation to act in 
certain ways; 
b) it is good for people to act in certain regular ways, to have certain (unthinking, 
uncritical) collective habits to act in certain ways; 
c) it is good for people to take themselves as having obligations to act in those 
ways; 
d) people have a duty to act as though they have obligations to act in those ways; 
e) people are under an obligation, or have a duty, to take themselves to be under 
an obligation to act in those ways; 
f) people have an obligation to act in those ways. 
 
Owens deals with two ǮǤǯ
One is the way in which individuals create, alter and dissolve obligations by say-
so through acts of ordering, requesting, consenting, forgiving, promising, etc (call 
these obligation-choosing actions). The other is the way in which social practices 
create a normative landscape, creating, altering and/or further determining ǤǯǤ
because his answer to the first rejects the view that there is a universal human 
interest served by obligation-choosing actions. He rejects this view because he 
thinks that the significance (or validity in the sense of success) of obligation-
choosing actions cannot be accounted for by reference to non-normative 
interests served by such actions (or by the practices of everyone doing so). This 
is because of the problem of bare wronging. However, Owens also rejects the Ǯǯ
wrong and there is no more to be said about it. Owens seeks to articulate a 
critical common-sensism, saving appearances but avoiding dogmatism by giving 
an account of an irreducibly normative interest served by obligation-choosing 
actions. However, a condition of our having normative interests is the existence 
of practices in which people recognise the obligations that help to constitute 
those interests. Indeed, the notion of a normative interest is the notion of an 
interest that a normative practice partly creates or enables Ȃ the explanation of 
the interest irreducibly refers to terms that are intelligible only in the context of 
the practice, or once the practice has reality. Hence Owens is committed to the 
view that convention can extend and enrich our interests.  
 
So how ǯǮǯ
(p. 161) come in? Once a practice is established that serves (by creating) an 
interest, that is, once there are enough people in the habit of recognising such 
obligations (or acting as though there were such obligations), and there is some ǡǮȏǤȐǯȋǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 
What is doing the work here? The importance of the new interest created by the 
practice? Take the situation where someone has gone through those actions 
conventionally taken to constitute the making of a promise, including appearing 
to intend to affect her obligations by choosing so to do (and declaring that she is 
doing so) but where they now insist that tǯ
obligation. There is plenty to say in many cases, since the withdrawal of the 
obligation-ǯǤǡ
it might be problematic in the case of bare wronging. So is Owǯǯ
should not be so treated, so to speak, is that there is a normative interest served 
by the practice? 
 
[Note also the role of habit in determining the obligations of friendship.] 
 
 
 
Normative interests 
For Hume, there are artificial virtues. Social institutions like property ownership 
or promising allow us to control how people will behave towards us. So these 
institutions are justified in terms of their effect on our non-normative interests. ǮǯȂ obligations whose existence is to be explained 
(at least in part) by reference to our interest in the existence of those obligations 
(p. 3). But for Owens, as well as non-normative interests, we also have normative 
interests, interests the specification of which requires reference to normative ǣǮȋȌ
their impact on our non-ǤǯȋǤ ?Ȍ 
 
Cf interested and non-interested wrongings p. 65. Interested wrongings are 
those that exist in part because of our interest in their being wronging. 
 
p. 85 defines interested obligations as those that exist because they are chosen, 
and with respect to which we can ask whether they are choiceworthy. However, ǮǯȂ whereas 
another way of understanding the category of interested obligation is those 
obligations that require convention, and which therefore raise the question of 
our interest in those conventions existing. 
 ǮǤǯȋǤ ?ȌǢ
interest in promise. 
 
Normative interest is, not an explanandum of the theory, or simply a 
presupposition, but a postulate of the theory that might be vindicated by the 
success of the theory. 
 
Example of normative interest: I have an interest in whether it is appropriate for 
me to blame my friend if he were disloyal to me. 
Is it the case, ǯǡ
alter obligations because it would be good if we had it (it is in our interest to 
have it)? This seems to be part of the story Ȃ but we also need the idea of social 
convention (p. 9). The interests that make it the case that having certain 
obligations would be good for us are pre-conventional in the sense that they can 
be identified without reference to particular practices or conventions. But 
normative interests are interests in our having or creating or sustaining certain 
conventions or practices.  
 ǮǤǯ
basic in the sense that they are not grounded in more basic non-normative 
interests. Taxonomy of possible relationships between normative and non-
nromative interests on pp. 65-6: reducible; direct dependence; indirect 
dependence; embeddedness. 
 
We have interests in being able to control whether certain actions will be 
blameworthy, or whether they will count as wrongings. Forgiveness is of a 
wronging, but it makes it the case that the wronging is no longer blameworthy. 
(Though this assumes that the object of blame is the wronging, not the wrong. 
What is our reaction to wrongs?) 
 
Our deontic interests seem to be various. But in the case of friendship, it is that 
having the capacity to create obligations through friendship (creating them both 
by incurring these obligations by beginning a friendship and determining the 
content of these obligations by habit) is good for us because it allows the 
creation of something of non-instrumental value within our lives, something that 
enriches our lives, but of which the presence of obligations is a constitutive part. 
Hence the friendship is non-instrumentally valuable only because of the 
presence of its characteristic bonds. (This seems plausible, but does Owens give 
a good explanation of why this is?) A different explanation of the value of e.g. our 
promissory interest would be necessary. NB: Owens argues that most of our 
deontic interests in friendship are directly dependent on non-normative 
interests (p. 118). 
 
Controlling and creating obligations 
One degree of artificiality of obligations concerns their reliance on social 
convention Ȃ e.g. requirements of respect or politeness, where one might 
dishonour a person by failing to given them the conventionally-accepted 
treatment of respect. One way of justifying these obligations is to explain that 
they have not been simply created by human fiat but that they inescapably arise 
in order to meet pre-existing ends Ȃ ends that were already obligatory for us to 
pursue. But another degree of artificiality involves the apparent creation and 
alteration of obligations at will by the acts of promising, forgiving, consent, 
command, etc.  
Obligations come with degrees of choice-dependence: 
0) Many obligations do not depend on choice 
1) Some obligations are choice-dependent in that they are only fairly imposed 
when someone has chosen to put themselves in that situation Ȃ e.g. reciprocity, 
bearing burdens of past actions, etc 
2) Incurring obligation only if one knows that in acting thus one incurs that 
obligation (can only be justified by our interest in their obtaining Ȃ and can only 
serve such interests in control if we are aware we are incurring them) 
3) Exercise of normative power Ȃ change what someone is obliged to do by 
intentionally communicating the intention of hereby so doing (performatives) 
 
Overall Structure of Argument 
The challenge of the book is to make sense of our reasons to comply e.g. with 
promises even when the action of compliance with the promise may serve no 
human interest. In other words, the view Owens calls Rationalism is the view 
that action only makes sense where it serves some Value or Good or Interest. But 
the notion of bare compliance with obligation involves action serving no such 
End. So the question is how we make sense of it. 
 
Defence of complying with bare obligation: 
 Ǯǡǡense for us to fulfil a promise because it is in our 
interest that such a thing should make sense. And, given the autonomy of such 
normative interests, it might be in our interests for fulfilment to make sense even 
if the actual fulfilment of the promise would further no interest (either 
normative or non-ǡǯȌǡ
involve neither compliance with nor conformity to any reason. The value that 
makes sense of our discharging this obligation lies in the power to create the 
obligation rather than in the act that discharges it. And where it is a good thing 
that we would be wronging X by breaking our promise to X, it makes sense for us 
to keep our promise to X whether or not there is any good in keeping it. Since it 
is possible to make sense of a human action other than by reference to the fact 
that it furthers a human interest, both Objective and Subjective Rationalism must 
be rejected as accounts of intentional agency. Nevertheless, what it makes sense 
for us to do is always determined by human interests, where these include ǤǯȋǤ ? ?Ȍ 
 
But also there is an argument that it is good for us that we are able to create and 
alter our obligations Ȃ and that it being good for us is part of what makes these 
obligations binding Ȃ or at any rate intelligible to comply with. 
 
Blame 
Instances of blame may be regrettable, but we may nevertheless value our habit 
of blaming and feeling guilty because we see it as a necessary part of certain 
valuable relationships. 
 
Contrast a value-tracking notion of blame, where blame helps us register the 
value of our relationships, and a value-constituting notion. 
 
Friendships are valuable in part because they make blame appropriate Ȃ they are 
valuable in part, that is, because they involve loyalties, loyalties involve 
obligation, and blame is an appropriate response to breach of obligation. 
 
Rivalry (p. 29) is a valuable relationship that may involve responsibilities to one 
another Ȃ to play the game in the right spirit, really trying, etc Ȃ and one may 
react to the failure of these responsibilities by feeling contempt or annoyance 
(just as one may react with admiration to someone who performs well, etc.). But 
anger is not necessary to bring value to this relationship.  
 
We can distinguish accuracy, aptness and desirability of emotions. Accuracy is 
simply representing world correctly (taking for granted intentional object of 
emotion). Desirability is independent of accuracy and may be all-things-
considered judgement: accuracy is insufficient and may be unnecessary ȋǯǡǤ
32). Aptness can be undermined even when emotion is accurate, e.g. when blame 
would be accurate for breach, but it is something I have done to that person 
myself a number of times in the past.  
 
Object of blame, for Owens, is breach of obligation, not manifestation of ill will or 
lack of consideration. This is clear in his discussion of excuse making blame inapt 
but not inaccurate. 
 
Wrongs and wronging 
There seems to be a difference between doing wrong and wronging someone. It 
is not clear that all wrongs need wrong someone. Two questions: what does the 
difference consist in? And why is there a difference between being wronged by 
someone and being involved in a wrong? Possible answers to the first question 
are that wronging involves incurring a demand for compensation, that wronging ǯ-empts some obligation they 
could have released you from by consenting (Hart), that it gives you the right to 
demand an apology Ȃ or that the person wronging incurs obligation to apologise. 
Owens is more interested in the second question Ȃ his answer is that, if there is 
an important difference here, it lies in our interest in there being a difference; 
specifically our interest in being able to control and alter the normative situation 
of those who wrong us.  
 
Obligation 
Is an obligation something to be weighed with other reasons? Or is it something ǯreedom to deliberate practically about the balance of relevant 
reasons. The former is Simple Rationalism: it cannot account for the latter. But 
Owens thinks the latter is in conflict with any form of Rationalism about 
Obligation. 
 
Obligation is not a factor in our deliberation. It is not a reason for action. (p. 69) 
 
Scanlon (echoing McDowell): moral perspective silences certain reasons, it does 
not simply outweigh them. Owens: can this help us explain how promise works? 
[One problem with this is that promises can be outweighed Ȃ therefore they 
cannot simply exclude practical force of other reasons in way moral perspective ǤȐǯ
promise, even if one remains bound by it. 
 
Is obligation like policy, or habit? Policies are essential to the virtue of 
resoluteness: they save time and energy on deliberation, allow for long-term 
projects, and prevent our being tempted or distracted. Thus it can be rational to 
do an action for which there is no particular reason at that time, because it is 
rational not to re-open deliberation about whether to have that policy. There can 
of course be reasons to re-examine the policy, but one should only do so when 
those reasons are salient. Policies are adopted for a reason to do with the overall 
pattern of behaviour they involve. Habits, however, can arise simply through the 
repetition of individual actions. Also, policies are only ever of instrumental value, 
whereas habits can be valuable in their own right Ȃ e.g. the habit of going 
running with a friend which is partly constitutive of the loyalty and bonds and 
obligations that make friendship good. (Action can be intentional in two ways Ȃ Ǯǡs about whether there is ǤǯǮǡ
sensitive to your views about whether there is anything desirable about the ǤǯȋǤ ? ?ȌȌch 
there is nothing valuable but that manifests a habit that is valuable in its own 
right and hence a virtue Ȃ in which case Simple Rationalism is again shown to be 
problematic. 
 ǯǡ-level: it provides a first-order reason and then a 
second-order exclusionary reason (thus a protected reason). Commands 
obligate; whereas requests do not. Requests communicate the intention of 
hereby giving the recipient a reason; commands obligate. Owens rejects the idea 
that obligation gives a first order reason. He also rejects the idea that requests do 
not give a person reason to exclude certain reasons rather than simply weighing Ǥǯǡ
person to do something gives a person a reason to do that thing that they can 
weigh with other reasons; whereas requesting is more than simply saying you ǤǮ
petitioner is able to ensure by declaration alone that it makes sense for someone ǤǯȋǤ ? ?Ȍ 
 ǮǤǯȋǤ ? ?Ȍ 
 
ǯ 
I have promised to have lunch with you. But subsequently I receive an invitation 
to lunch with a serious romantic prospect I have been pursuing for some time. 
Both of you are about to leave town for a considerable time, so with respect to 
the romantic prospect, I must seize the moment if I am not to lose it. Owens says 
that deliberation about the possibility of going to the lunch is what the promise 
is meant to exclude (p. 91). But is this over-rigorous? Clearly there is the 
possibility of re-negotiating your promises. True, the re-negotiation has to 
happen in order to make it free of guilt. But how should we allow for the 
possibility of re-negotiation if it is true that promises exclude considerations 
from deliberation? In planning to ask you whether I can re-negotiate our lunch 
date I am precisely re-opening the issue. What is true, however (or is it?), is that I 
leave it in your hands to settle whether we will have lunch on that day or not. If 
you decide that you are unable to change the date (say, without serious 
inconvenience to yourself) and want to stick to the original plan, then that is 
what I must do. However, there is something to be said about this too: is it true 
(as Owens must think) that I must accede to your decision, however 
unreasonable it might be? If I request re-negotiation, and explain my situation 
(say, we are on sufficiently intimate terms for this to be possible), my request 
makes it the case that you now have reason to comply unless you have 
considerable reason to prefer the current arrangement. Do I have reason to 
comply with unreasonably upheld promissory arrangements? One way out might 
be to suggest that my request puts the person under an obligation to re-consider, 
and only uphold the arrangement if they have sufficient grounds. In which case, 
if I am being wronged in the arrangement being upheld, it may be the case that 
this alters the character of any action by which I fail to fulfil my promissory 
obligation. ǯǡǡǯ
treating my request lightly or failing to give it consideration. So this would be a 
route Ǥ
ǡǯǡ
promises, in such a way that we have signed over our authority to make our own 
decisions about certain matters. Does this really ring true? 
 
In discussing this case, Owens says that a breach of promise might be justified 
but that it would still wrong you, and as such it would be appropriate to feel guilt 
(even if it would not be appropriate for others to blame). Guilt acknowledges the 
promise, even if it is not fulfilled. (This is a case in which the considerations that 
justify breaking the promise are amongst those that are meant to be excluded by 
it. Promises do not exclude all alternative courses of action Ȃ for instance, caring ǯǤ care for a sick child may ǯ
though it is not fulfilled: p. 90) (There is also discussion of a case very much like 
Holton/Langton: where one promises firmly but informally to take a job and 
then gets a better offer: can be justified to take the better job, and unreasonable 
for Chair to insist you do not, but should still feel guilty). He acknowledges that it 
can be unreasonable for the promise to insist on performance. But why insist in 
that case that promise works through the exclusion of considerations from ǫǡǯ
breaking the promise is not something the conscientious person would have 
done (p. 91): but why should we give the conscientious person any authority in 
our feelings? The conscientious person sounds as though they would be quite 
unreasonable, lacking in any sense of proportion (i.e. giving disproportionate 
importance to obligations) and having an impoverished life. So the aptness of 
guilt seems under-explained. 
 
Another issue concerns the object of blame and guilt. Do we feel blame and guilt 
only for wronging? Or how does blame or guilt for wronging relate to blame for 
wrongs, or unjustified wrongs? Some people take guilt to involve a kind of self-
alienation that involves the repudiation of the guilty act and the guilty self that 
endorsed it. Guilt on this view is a kind of self-reproach. For Owens, however, 
guilt is rather a sense of unsatisfied (pro tanto) claim Ȃ a claim that cannot be 
met, perhaps, but is not thereby cancelled, a Williams-ǮǤǯ 
Which raises the question how Owens-style guilt relates to moral remainders ǯǡǯǡ
one was the only person who could have helped, but where this was overridden 
by some other, perhaps more weighty (or perhaps exclusionary) demand (how ǯ
to give a single dose of drug to, and which he says is a case of agent-regret?). Or 
take the case of Billy Budd, where the captain opts for his role-obligation rather 
than his duty of natural justice to Billy (though perhaps he would have felt guilty 
whichever he had done)? What is the nature of the feeling in this case? In ǡǯ
reserve the term guilt for this Ȃ Ǯǯ
adequate. Alternatively, look at what he says about moral shame Ȃ guilt is for 
unmet obligations, but moral shame is for failures to live up to moral standards? 
On the other hand, captain need feel no moral shame for what he has done Ȃ but 
is it guilt even though there is no Owens-style obligation? 
 
This all relates to the question of what the status of wrongings are vis-a-vis 
wrongs, and unjustified actions generally, and how these things stand with 
respect to forgiveness and guilt and blame. How does forgiveness of wrongings 
relate to forgiveness of wrongs or unjustified actions? I think Owens is right that 
we might need forgiveness for acts that are wrongings but not unjustified; but is 
there a role for forgiveness for acts that are unjustified but not wronging Ȃ and if 
there is, does this mean that, in a case in which there is an unjustified wronging, 
there are two faces of forgiveness, for instance, that which Owens identifies, and 
a more redemptive sort? 
 
Convention, custom and obligation 
Habit can determine e.g. what counts as loyalty in friendship, or what the duties 
of a friendship are (p. 101) Ȃ ǮǯǤ 
 
Also, implicit understandings are necessary to fill out the content of promissory 
obligations Ȃ if you promise to deliver my TV I expect it not disassembled even 
though I did not specify this in the promise. 
 
Friendships, for Owens Ȃ and this is why they are different from the benefactor-
plus model Ȃ require a history in which people negotiate (perhaps implicitly 
rather than explicitly) and habitually recognise their obligations to one another Ȃ 
come to a settled, formed, instituted view of that their relationship is and 
requires. 
 
Consent ǡǮǯm. The wrongness of rape is the 
wrongness of doing something without consent. That is why its wrongness can 
be removed by consent (in a way that many wrongs cannot be consented to, p. 
179). 
 
If the wrong of rape is sex without consent, how can there be acts that aggravate 
its wrongness, e.g. such as biting (p. 180)? 
 
----------------------------------- 
 ǯ-Ǯǯǡo 
create reasons for those subject to the authority, but they cannot do so in their 
own right. Reasons are created for subjects only by the directives of legitimate 
authority, and legitimate authority exists only where the purported authority 
serves the interests of those subject to it. Specifically, it should serve their 
interests by making it more likely that they will, in following its directives, 
comply with the reasons applying to them anyway than they would have by 
acting independently. We can call Raǯfunctional justification of ǡǮǫǯ
we do as the authority requires. 
 ǯ-level account Ȃ the apparently agent-relative, voluntarily-created 
directives at the day-to-day level, and the agent-neutral, non-created interests at 
the level of critical justification. The point of a theory like this is to resolve the 
mystery of how one person can apparently at will create binding reasons for 
another. Appeal to interests is an attractive avenue of inquiry because of their 
undeniable importance and their immunity to human decision. But can a 
functional view succeed? Some have suspected a lack of fit between the two 
levels. One problem is that authority is only justified in piecemeal fashion, 
depending on the domain and the expertise of individual subjects. Another 
problem is that it only succeeds in justifying subjects acting as though the 
authority created obligations for them, but does not justify those obligations 
themselves. ǡǯ
understanding of authority relations unchanged Ȃ rather it might be said he 
reveals authority relations to be no more than rules of thumb that it is advisable 
to follow for practical reasons, rather than genuine sources of reasons 
themselves.  
 
Functionalism about obligation, for all its attractions, might therefore undermine 
rather than justify obligations Ȃ it might simply consist in replacing those Ǥǯǡǫ
do we need to continue to believe in the validity of those obligations rather than 
just in interests and the means to their furtherance? What has been shown, it 
might be said, is simply that obligations have no normative force independently 
of the interests that our following them serves. Thus functionalism about 
obligation vindicates rather than resolves our sense of the mystery of voluntarily-
created obligations. 
 
In contrast to this approach, David Owens seeks to resolve the mystery of 
obligation. ǯǡ
with what we might call obligation-choosing actions such as promise, consent, 
forgiveness and involvement in relations of friendship and loyalty (the 
obligations over which we have power of choice are not necessarily our own 
obligations, but can also be the obligations of others, such as when in consenting 
we make it the case that someone will not wrong us by e.g. taking our property). ǡǡǮǯǡshould 
change the nature of my actions with regard to a particular object, as why the 
reciting of a liturgy by a priest, in a certain habit and posture, should dedicate a ǡǡǡǯȋǡ
Enquiries, p. 199). Hume takes the functionalist route to explain the difference 
between obligation-choosing and empty ritual. But Owens is dissatisfied with 
that route, and one of his main worries can be seen as a version of the Ǯǯǣ that functionalism of this stripe will fail to vindicate 
our sense of obligation in cases where fulfilling the apparent obligation serves no Ǥǡǡǯ
resolve the mystery of obligation by explaining the intelligibility of what he calls ǮǤǯ 
 
A wrong is a bare wrong when it consists solely in the breach of obligation and 
does not set back any other (non-ǡǯȂ see 
below) interests. So for instance, if Maklay the anthropologist has promised not 
to take a photograph of a Malay because the latter fears the loss of his soul, and 
yet he photographs him while asleep (in such a way that neither the Malay nor 
Ȍǡǯd the Malay but he will 
have wronged him (p. 125). If a terminally ill rapist in the final days of life drugs 
his victim, uses a condom, never tells a soul, then it might be the case that the 
victim is not harmed by the rape (p. 177). Other examples could be drawn from 
the literature on authority: your deciding, in the final days of terminal illness, to 
disobey my authoritative directive wrongs me even in a case in which your 
disobedience remains secret and you are right to think I made the wrong 
decision; even though the balance of interests is served by disobedience, 
disobedience wrongs the authority operating in its proper jurisdiction. 
Functionalism about interests cannot account for these cases, cases which, 
however, seem to arise inescapably if we take our possession of normative 
powers to create, waive and alter obligations at face value. As Owens puts it: ǮǯȋǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 
In each of these supposed cases of bare wronging the functionalist can have a 
story to tell, at least about why, given that acts such as promise-breaking and 
rape normally harm interests, we should have such strong reactions against 
them even in such cases. However, the suspicion will be that this is more of a 
psychological story than a moral one. The moral mystery, on reflection, remains. 
 ǯǡǤ
philosophers tend to pride themselves on their superiority to the folk, this might 
lead them to downplay the rationǤǯ
inclined to take it, as a defeasible default, that what the folk would judge valid 
after what counts in real situations as serious moral thinking, has a strong claim Ǥǯssiveness with the easy 
assumption that, if we want to judge the rationality of our tendencies and 
practices, measuring them against our interests is the only game in town, and 
much of what the folk (and philosophers when they are acting and thinking as 
foȌǯǤǡ
there are many ways to dismiss folk thinking too easily, there clearly are folk 
norms that are morally bankrupt and have no claim to be taken seriously. Is our 
talk of wronging as distinct from interests part of what we need to slough off? My 
sense is that we have not yet exhausted the attempt to resolve the apparent 
mysteries of talk of wronging, and that this is what we need to do before taking 
the last resort of functionalism. 
 
The aspiration expressed in the last paragraph may be all very well, but what 
would an alternative to functionalism look like? One possibility is something 
Kantian, justifying the normativity of our obligation-choosing activities from a 
minimal notion of end-setting rationality. However, for those who doubt 
something so rich can be derived from something so formal without sleight-of-
hand, the alternatives to functionalism may look meagre. ǯ
provide something more satisfying. 
 
First of all, Owens makes it clear that he does not seek to show that our talk of 
obligation is all-things-considered (or perhaps even pro tanto) justified. What he 
seeks to do is rather to make it intelligible. This would therefore only be a first 
step in any full vindication of folk talk of obligation and wronging. Secondly, 
while in some respects Owens argues against functionalism, his account can be 
read as explaining what functionalism would have to be like in order to be 
adequate to the phenomenon of bare wronging. Rather than entirely eschew the 
assumption that we make action intelligible by relating it to interests (what ǮǯȋǤ ? ?-14)), Owens rather deploys an expansive 
notion of interests Ȃ normative interests. 
 
The idea behind normative interests is that the interest in question cannot be 
explained without reference to those normative features reference to the 
interest seeks to justify. Illustrating our interest in consent, for instance, Owens 
gives the example of a speaker at a conference announcing her name and topic 
and allowing anyone in the audience there by mistake to leave. In giving consent 
to people leaving, the speaker makes it possible for people who may want to 
leave because they have mistaken the room to leave without wronging the 
speaker by leaving in the middle of the talk. The interest consent serves is 
irreducibly normative: given that certain things that people could do to us would 
normally wrong us, we have an interest in making it possible that people can 
treat us in those ways without wronging us. This is not because we have a non-
normative interest in controlling the basic conditions of our lives, or making 
what happens to us maximally in line with our choices, but rather simply 
because we have an interest in not having others wrong us by so acting. Indeed, 
the wrong that would be done by someone leaving in the middle of the talk 
would not be the wrong of disrupting my concentration or distracting my 
audience, but rather the wrong of leaving without consent.  It is because it is this 
wrong in particular that is at issue that consent can annul it (so presumably one 
who disrupts my concentration by leaving may wrong me even if I have given 
her consent to leave.)  
 
There is a suspicion of circularity, or indeed of redundancy, here, of course; but ǯ
because, although it does not attempt to reduce our normative interest to 
independent non-normative interests, there are various other possibilities, all of 
which are consistent with the plausible idea that, without some connection to 
our non-normative interests, normative interests would not make sense. For 
instance, our normative interests might be indirectly dependent on our normative 
interests in such a way that they depend on those interests without it being the 
case that in each case where a normative interest is served a non-normative 
interest is also served. Or else normative interests might be embedded in non-
normative interests in such a way that, while we cannot fully understand our 
normative interests without reference to our non-normative interests, we also 
cannot fully understand our non-normative interests without reference to our 
normative interests (p. 66). This latter possibility in particular raises an ǯǤ
Owens recognises wrongs that consist in their effect on our non-normative 
interests as well as wrongs that are bare wronging. Unlike the former, the latter 
are convention-dependent: bare wrongings only exist where there is a social 
practice of recognising them to exist. This is not to say that the wrong consists in 
nothing more than convention dictating that the agent has been wronged. But ǡǯeducibility story, is it to say that, once the practice is in 
ǡǯ-normative interests. 
Rather, although Owens clearly wants to reject narrow accounts of what it is for ǯǡǮǯǯȋǤ ?ȌǡǤ
is the case, however, then the possibility of embedded interests means that the 
development of new social practices has the capacity to extend the range of 
human interests Ȃ not simply by serving pre-existing interests more efficiently, 
but playing a creative role in their development. 
 
